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A need for epistemic due diligence is standardly recognized by all kinds of investigator. For 
some professions and vocations – including academics, journalists, police, courts and 
intelligence officers – being clear about the basis of knowledge claimed is a stringent 
requirement of the occupation. But if it is incumbent on dedicated investigators to be critical, 
as well as honest and transparent, in their handling of evidence, their duty in the matter 
normally extends only to matters within their designated field of inquiry.1 The question for 
this paper concerns duties that academics in general, and social philosophers more 
particularly,2 may have to check claims of knowledge emanating from fields beyond their 
professional expertise or individual competence. 
It might be supposed that the duty most applicable under such circumstances is to 
avoid pronouncing on matters that one is not competent to pronounce on. A self-denying 
ordinance would thus be appropriately observed. 
The argument of this article, however, is that the presumptive justification of 
agnosticism cannot be sustained with regard to deliberations about matters of such significant 
public concern as those to be focused on, which relate to claims of a humanitarian case for 
coercive intervention. Implied in the making of these particular claims is a presumption of 
collective humanitarian responsibilities. A corollary that serves as a premise of this article is 
that, as a society, we collectively have a humanitarian responsibility to organize our 
intellectual capacities in such a way that preventable egregious harms like war have the best 
possible chance of being prevented. The central concern of this investigation is with 
erroneous beliefs that can prevail in an intellectual community, if only for a time, when 
during that time some serious harm might result from action in the world being taken on the 
                                                        
1 Amelie Rorty has discussed the commonsense view ‘that we are obliged to fulfill the duty of due diligence only 
as far and as much as is necessary to act as responsibly as our situations and roles require’, pointing out, however, 
that it is circular: ‘the conditions for epistemic responsibility refer to those of moral responsibility; and those of 
moral responsibility presuppose epistemic responsibility.’ (Rorty 2010: 37) Developing this line of thought, and 
writing of ethical responsibilities of those engaged in advancing knowledge and understanding, Mitcham and Von 
Schomberg (2000) suggest a need to look beyond role responsibility to ideas of co-responsibility, as expanded 
upon a little in the text later on. 
2 The term ‘social philosopher’ is used here in a broad sense to encompass all who engage in ethical reflection on 
issues studied empirically in the social sciences. I take it the readership of this journal comprises a range of moral, 
political, social and legal philosophers and others with an interest in the application of normative principles to 
practical situations of current public interest. 
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basis of those beliefs. The mounting of a case for humanitarian intervention involving 
coercive, even military, means is an archetypal situation of this kind.  
The article will argue for three distinct duties of epistemic diligence. The first follows 
from the rationale for the self-denying ordinance, namely, the need to avoid making 
uninformed, ill-informed or misinformed pronouncements. It adds a degree of vigilance 
regarding the judgment involved in deciding whereof one should remain silent insofar as this 
is to make a substantive decision. Such a decision, in practice, is unlikely to be entirely clear-
cut. For our understanding of our cognitive competences and their limitations is likely to be 
less complete than we realize: there may be things we think we know, but don’t, and things 
we think we don’t know, but do. It is unrealistic to suppose one can rely on a clear distinction 
between what one knows and what one does not know.3  Being diligent to avoid speaking 
beyond one’s competence is thus not only a matter of remaining silent on certain matters but 
also of checking that one’s silence is not tacit acquiescence in a substantive view that is 
actually controversial and quite possibly false. A first duty, then, is to avoid allowing oneself 
to be deceived and thereby potentially to be in a position unintentionally to deceive others 
about the nature of the context in which a normative recommendation is likely to be applied. 
What this entails, at a minimum, is taking some care when devising thought experiments to 
characterize an ethical question. As Henry Shue showed with regard to arguments premised 
on the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario offered as justification for torture, even some general 
substantive characterizations of situations can be epistemologically unwarranted. The 
argument to be developed in Section 1 presses Shue’s point further so as to problematize the 
assumption that intelligence obtained by methods other than torture is necessarily any more 
epistemologically sound. For both experience and reasonable general inferences about the 
nature of intelligence gathering caution us to withhold unreserved deference to official 
sources or authorized narratives. 
A question then picked up in Section 2 is how skeptical it is rational to be. At the 
extreme, one might avoid being misled by just refusing to believe anything, but this would 
undercut the possibility of engaging meaningfully in social philosophy. In any case, one 
                                                        
3 In fact, any such assessment presupposes some means of managing a dilemma that has exercised philosophers at 
least since Plato’s formulation of Meno’s paradox. The dilemma, as Thomas Nickles summarises it, ‘is that either 
we already know the solution to our problem (the answer to our question) or we do not. If we do already know, 
then we cannot genuinely inquire. And if we don’t know, then we also cannot inquire, for then we would have no 
way to recognize the solution (answer) even should we stumble upon it accidentally.’ (Nickles 2015: 63) What 
Nickles identifies as a flaw in the Meno argument ‘is that it places us in an all-or-nothing position regarding 
knowledge, failing to allow that there can be (fallible) cues as to whether or not we are making progress toward a 
solution.’ (Nickles 2015: 63-4) Heuristic appraisal can discern ‘hints and clues that can provide direction to 
inquiry in the sometimes large gap between the extremes of complete knowledge and complete ignorance.’ 
(Nickles 2015: 64)  
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needs to recognize just how much one always takes on trust even when striving to be 
rigorously independent in one’s critical reasoning. For the development of knowledge is a 
highly socialized process, as Steve Clarke (2002, 2007) emphasizes, so extremes of 
skepticism are as much to be avoided as those of deference. They can be avoided by adopting 
rationally defensible methods of responding to anomalies in official stories and authoritative 
narratives – and there is a range of different kinds of response that can be appropriate 
depending on a variety of contextual factors. The defensibility of a response would ultimately 
be determined by reference to the kinds of factor that make for what Clarke, following Imre 
Lakatos (1970), calls a progressive research programme, as opposed to one that is 
degenerating. The general idea here is that research can be regarded as progressive as long as 
it yields novel predictions that in due course come to be verified. 4 
Given that this kind of diligence can be done, the argument can be made for regarding 
it as a duty. For the risk to be averted, on humanitarian grounds, is not only that one may be 
deceived in thinking one can remain agnostic about empirical questions when engaging in 
applied philosophy, but that others may be misled or deceived in ways that one could have 
helped them avoid. Harms can arise from the enactment of others’ recommendations that one 
fails to oppose as well as from those one supports. It can thus be argued that, in certain kinds 
of circumstance, one has a duty to check that others are not misled. Instances of such a 
circumstance would be where the humanitarian stakes are high and those who are reproducing 
potentially dangerous misinformation are within reach of one’s influence. A particular 
circumstance would be one where other academics are supporting a case for coercive 
intervention on grounds that one knows – from having discharged the first duty of due 
diligence – to be epistemologically questionable.  Accordingly, the argument of Section 2 is 
that there is a duty to seek to protect others from being misled by problematic narratives. Its 
premise is that one can meaningfully engage in assessment of the epistemological basis of 
knowledge claims outside one’s particular empirical expertise. For doing so need involve not 
producing positive knowledge of the substantive issues but assessing reports that bear the 
claims of knowledge into the public domain. These can be checked for contradictions or 
methodological inconsistencies internally, and the consistency of the report’s knowledge 
claims can also be checked externally against relevant contextual and general knowledge. 
                                                        
4 I adopt Clarke’s terminology, since he has introduced it into relevant debates in applied epistemology. But while 
the framing of the account that follows is broadly consistent with Lakatos’ view of the development of science, the 
ideas here are more general and could be expressed as well in other terms. For instance, what Lakatos refers to as a 
"research programme" might in some contexts be referred to as a "working model". In this terminology, a model 
that has many adjustable parameters (auxiliary hypotheses) can adapt to fit the observations, but will usually have 
poor performance at predicting new observations because it is too tied to the data of a particular situation (an issue 
that in machine learning, for instance, is referred to as ‘overfitting’). A good model will generate novel predictions 
that in due course come to be verified. I thank Paul McKeigue for his observations on these matters. 
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This approach may not directly generate new positive knowledge, but it can show certain 
positive claims to be false, which can be highly significant when acceptance of the claims 
would be taken as justification for harmful action that might otherwise have been avoided. 
The problem addressed in Section 3 is that false claims are nonetheless sometimes 
accepted as a basis for deciding on action. In this circumstance, the duty is not only to protect 
against mistakenly accepting a false account but also to correct a false account that has gained 
acceptance. This can be a qualitatively more demanding task in at least two respects. One is 
that the correction may require the affirmation of a more satisfactory positive account, and 
while any competent report reader may be able to identify anomalies in one account, it may 
take considerable expertise and research to produce a better alternative: such a project would 
normally require collaboration of relevant experts and a considerable investment of effort. 
The other is that it involves a preparedness to be resiliently persistent – for in this 
circumstance, researchers may be confronted by protagonists who are actively promoting, and 
have a stake in maintaining, the claim. The third duty, accordingly, cannot adequately be 
conceptualised on an individualistic model of responsibility, and nor can it be specially 
assigned to social philosophers. The kind of work involved inherently involves 
interdisciplinary collaboration, and a duty to engage in it has to be thought of as a collective 
one. The argument to be developed, accordingly, is of a collective duty of co-responsibility 
that falls particularly on those entrusted collectively to underwrite knowledge claims – 
especially universities – and that devolves onto individuals via a principle of due 
responsiveness. This does not here involve stipulating any very particular interpretation of 
that principle or rules for applying it. Indeed, for reasons that become clearer as we go along, 
the matter is one that involves elements reasonably regarded – from the standpoint of any 
individual agent – as supererogatory. So the argument is not that every academic, for 
instance, should necessarily be held to be under such a duty. The point is, in Shue’s words, 
the collective responsibility is to achieve ‘full coverage’,5 whatever more specific individual 
or group duties that might entail. An important part of the argument is that those agents who 
are appropriately responsive to the collective imperative should have the support of the rest of 
the intellectual community, including universities as institutions. If social philosophers have 
any special obligation it is to evaluate this argument and, to the extent accepted, support it. 
In order to give as full a sense as possible, in the space available, of how the duties 
characterized in this paper might arise and be discharged in practice, reference is made to a 
case study.  The research referred to is still in progress, but its development so far provides 
sufficient material to illustrate the points made in the discussion. For the aim, in referring to 
                                                        
5 The reference here is to Shue (1988); for more on my own general perspective on the concept of responsibility in 
relation to duties see e.g. Hayward (1995: 162-172)  
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it, is not to offer a detailed account of the research programme but to show how it has 
progressively developed as implicit response to the ethical imperatives that can be 
conceptualised as the three duties argued for here. 
Section 1 
 
Assuming an overarching precept of 'do no harm', a first duty of an applied philosopher is to 
recommend no course of action that causes unnecessary, unjustifiable and avoidable harm. 
Assuming also that this would never be done intentionally, then the relevant duty of due 
diligence is to be sure to avoid doing so unintentionally. In particular, one should avoid 
assuming over-optimistic prognoses regarding the outcome of an action or being misled about 
the nature of the problem to which an action is proposed as a response. 
 Now it should be acknowledged that philosophers are generally careful not to be 
misled about the facts of a matter, and, indeed, normally refrain from making any empirical 
assumptions at all. Ethical considerations are discussed on a hypothetical, ceteris paribus, 
basis. When particular scenarios feature in an argument, they serve as ideal typical models 
rather than putative descriptions of the actual world. For the applied philosopher – whose 
expertise typically lies somewhere within a nexus of fields including social, political, legal 
and moral philosophy – the evaluation of claims of empirical fact or social explanation may 
lie beyond their professional competence. This would seem to be a sufficient reason to reject 
the idea that they have duties to engage in such an evaluation. Indeed, they will recognize 
duties to not pronounce beyond their competence and to be careful to insert due caveats and 
qualifications in any argument that depends on assumptions about facts or explanatory 
interpretations of them. 
The argument to be advanced here, however, is that a more nuanced view is possible 
(Nickles 2015) and that, in fact, it is ethically incumbent upon us to make efforts to develop 
one, as Amelie Rorty (2010) suggests. A key to doing so, as advocated by Carl Mitcham and 
Rene Von Schomberg (2000), is to recognize that a theory of occupational role responsibility 
is no longer in harmony with social reality of complex, multiple and fluid roles. So attaching 
responsibility to an individual’s role is often not feasible. But in view of the risk of allowing 
social irresponsibility to become normalized, they propose an ‘ethics of collective co-
responsibility’. For an individual to be co-responsible means being personally responsive,6 
                                                        
6 To develop an adequate account of this would be beyond the scope of the present paper. What due personal 
responsiveness consists in will vary with the nature of the question and of the co-responsibility assumed to apply 
in relation to it. For instance, Mihaela Mihai (forthcoming) focuses on duties of responsiveness to the epistemic 
position of more vulnerable people borne by academics in virtue of their privilege of presumed epistemic 
authority, emphasizing the need to think beyond specialist constraints, while recognizing reasons for due 
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and this can sometimes mean doing epistemic diligence on knowledge claims that lie beyond 
the bounds of their field or role as normally delineated.  
 The general idea appealed to in developing this line of argument is that applied ethics 
should not be regarded as independent of applied epistemology. This idea has recently 
undergone a revival,7 particularly in response to the changing circumstances of social 
knowledge dissemination that have arisen with the new information technologies. David 
Coady, for instance, argues that ‘applied epistemology is logically prior to applied ethics. Our 
actions are normatively, as well as causally, dependent on our beliefs.’ (Coady 2017: 58) 
Furthermore, he maintains, our beliefs themselves are a kind of action: ‘in applied 
epistemology we are discussing one particular aspect of how we ought to live, namely how 
we ought to live our intellectual life: how we should pursue knowledge, what we should 
believe, and so forth.’  (Coady 2017: 58) 
A basic element of epistemic due diligence incumbent on an ethicist is to be aware of 
how one’s beliefs may affect the way one argues, even – and perhaps especially – when these 
are not consciously present to one’s mind. Thus a good reason to be as diligent as possible 
with regard to one’s assumptions about the world, even when engaging in seemingly abstract 
theoretical considerations or intuitive thought experiments, is that these assumptions may be 
influencing one’s ethical argument more than one realizes, possibly shaping and steering it. 
Furthermore, it is not only philosophers who advance action-guiding arguments, and, in the 
world of practical decision making, actors may focus more on the positive case for a 
recommendation than on the caveats concerning its applicability. Thus a recommendation is 
liable to assume a ‘life of its own’ as it is taken up by others and, shorn of important caveats, 
comes to exercise influence in the world of action.  
A dilemma in practice, then, where decisions must be taken and action guided, is that 
the need to attain some rational guidance for decision-making can come into tension with the 
need for epistemological scrupulousness. So an appropriate balance in practice needs to be 
struck. Engaging in applied philosophy is fundamentally a matter of exercising judgment. 
                                                        
intellectual humility about the possibility of doing so. The question of how personal responsiveness links to 
collective co-responsibility, particularly in relation to humanitarian need, is explored by Christina Dineen (2018). 
Mitcham and Von Schomberg, meanwhile, in thinking more beyond ‘role responsibility’, focus on the challenges 
of attaining any epistemic authority in relation to complex structures of collective knowledge, where lack of 
empathy may not be the biggest obstacle. From the point of a conscientious individual working out their own 
moral duties, there is a place for all kinds of responsiveness. The focus in the present paper is on those of us who 
do have a degree of identifiable role responsibility – as ‘academics’ or ‘intellectuals’ – but with the recognition 
that our personal or civic responsibility is not exclusively related to such specialist expertise as our professional 
role calls for. 
7 Coady (2017) records how it was clearly present in works of many figures in the history of moral and political 
philosophy. 
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Judgment is involved in both the ethical and epistemological domains, but it also has an 
irreducible domain of its own. An ethical theory offers general reasons to favour a certain 
course of action in a given set of circumstances; an empirical theory explains the nature of a 
specific set of circumstances; but there remains a further question of whether and to what 
extent the specific circumstances resemble the kind assumed as the generic model. The 
answer to this question cannot be determined by simply consulting the two kinds of input, for 
whether the situation is one where the ethical theory applies is a distinct question requiring 
exercise of judgment.  
This irreducible role for judgment in arriving at ethical decisions has been particularly 
emphasized by Henry Shue. He has highlighted it in the context of just the kind of ethical 
issue that is of central substantive interest here. This is where the question is whether to 
countenance an exception to a strong moral proscription on a certain course of action in order 
to prevent a still more egregious human rights violation. 
Shue has made the issue vivid in his discussion of torture. While he holds the view that 
torture can never be justified, he recognizes that, given a sufficiently imaginative scenario, a 
case for exceptions might be constructed. He refers to influential arguments that explore 
justifications for torture on the basis of the ‘ticking bomb’ thought experiment. He argues that 
the scenario it presupposes – whereby vital information that will save many lives can be 
extracted by torturing a captured conspirator – fundamentally misrepresents the circumstances 
under which torture is actually practiced in the world. For it is encountered as an 
institutionalized practice that involves ‘a culture, expert teachers, innovative students, 
equipment testing, technique improvement, international communication, plus corrupt 
medical doctors who collaborate and corrupt lawyers (like those around Bush and Cheney) 
who cover-up and deny’ (Shue 2009: 314). In abstracting from those institutionalized 
realities, the ticking bomb scenario involves ‘a sociological fantasy’. To suppose the complex 
specificity of the facts can be set aside, Shue argues, ‘is to think that one can make wise moral 
assessments of practices without knowing how the practices work—indeed, without really 
knowing what the practices are. This is intellectually and morally irresponsible’ (Shue 2009: 
314).  
A similar point can be made in relation to coercive intervention. The crucial question 
regarding the possible justification for any kind of intervention – preventive or humanitarian 
– is whether intelligence ‘can be sufficiently reliable that it is not irresponsible to take human 
lives on the basis of it’ (Shue 2009: 316). Shue challenges the assumption that the epistemic 
value of information secured through torture could ever reliably be so great. He does believe, 
however, that intelligence obtained by other means can have sufficient epistemic value 
potentially to justify intervention on consequentialist grounds. Although he is not under any 
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illusion about the reality of how intelligence agencies can fail to live up to their public service 
mission, Shue sees this as a contingent problem that could in principle be resolved, rather 
than a contradictory tension at the very heart of the idea as in the case of torture. Thus he 
draws a contrast between the idea of the ‘ideal torturer’ and that of the ‘ideal spy’. The former 
is inherently self-contradictory: 
‘Successful torturers must avoid sympathy and empathy, or they will go too easy. But they 
must also avoid anger and cruelty, or they will go too hard and merely knock the victim 
senseless, or drive him into a dissociative state, and learn nothing useful for the prevention 
of catastrophe. Torture is not for amateurs-successful torturers need to be real "pros", and 
no one becomes a "pro" overnight. At a minimum, one must practice-perhaps do research, 
be mentored by the still more experienced. In short, torture needs a bureaucracy, with 
apprentices and experts, of the kind that torture in fact always has. … Torture is an 
institution.’ (Shue 2006: 236) 
Intelligence agencies, by contrast, although ‘notoriously unsuccessful’ in practice, could in 
principle be so organized and regulated as to deliver well-verified and solid intelligence (Shue 
2007). The organization of such intelligence operations would involve a great deal of 
coordination and resource, but not self-contradictory objectives or particular moral dilemmas. 
Thus, Shue’s view is that ‘the ideal torturer sounds like fantasy, but the ideal spy mainly 
sounds fabulously expensive’ (Shue 2009: 316).  
However, if we think about the nature of the ideal intelligence institution we find it is 
replete with as many, if not more, paradoxical requirements than those associated with 
torture. For one thing, intelligence agencies being established, as they supposedly are, to 
serve interests in national security, and no matter how benign and pacific those interests 
might be, their operations necessarily require some secrecy. For a state that aspires to be 
democratic there is thus an inherent tension: in the public interest some kinds of knowledge 
cannot be made public. So there need to be various checks and procedures to prevent secrecy 
and privilege being abused. But while mechanisms of democratic oversight are in principle 
possible, their effectiveness can be limited in practice (Otto 2017; Bakir 2018). Indeed, the 
idea of an ‘ideal intelligence agency’ is paradoxical inasmuch as the ‘ideal spy’ would be 
someone capable of deceiving you. The problem is not that spies can sometimes be double 
agents but that the whole organizational infrastructure of intelligence operations has to be 
capable of maintaining convincing deceptions. Even if intelligence personnel are selected for 
their probity and integrity, the problem remains that public deceptions need not originate with 
the intelligence officers. They may be scrupulously truthful in the confidential reports they 
convey to politically motivated decision-makers, but who can check that the latter are also as 
scrupulous? Members of the legislature may be able to ask certain questions of them, but this 
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cannot guarantee complete protection against any who might be determined to instrumentalise 
the system’s necessary features of opacity. Unfortunately, when it comes to information 
relevant to decisions about war and intervention, we have learned to be extremely cautious on 
that score. 
A problem for a society, then, is that intelligence reports are not open to peer review, 
so the knowledge they embody, and what is reported of it publicly, are matters over which 
neither members of the citizen body nor even their representatives in the legislature can 
exercise due diligence. And if that is so, what can be expected of academics? A duty to avoid 
being misled or making recommendations that could cause harm appears to imply keeping to 
a minimum any comment at all on actual cases of potential intervention. Yet the problem 
remains that other people will engage in ethical debate of such matters. Is there any duty to 
prevent them being misled in order to protect the wider public against decisions being taken 
that lead to serious avoidable harms? The answer to this question, assuming that ‘ought 
implies can’, depends on what it is possible to do.  
Section 2 
 
Intervention is a matter with respect to which there is a particular need not only for ethical 
diligence, as philosophers well recognize, but also for epistemic diligence. This latter need 
may be under-appreciated in the philosophical literature, but in some more empirically 
orientated fields it is well understood. If both the need for it and the possibility of it are 
accepted, then the case for this second duty follows from the same basis as the first. A need 
for it is in fact not hard to seek. Studies have identified a clearly discernible presumption in 
favour of intervention by the Western-led ‘international community’ (Desch 2008; Parmar 
2009; Dixon 2019), and this is built into the very framing of purportedly factual reports that 
reach the public via the news media (Milojevich and Beattie 2018). Given the potential for 
harm of acting on reports favouring intervention, there is a clear ethical imperative to engage 
in critical assessment of them rather than simply accept them. The argument of this section 
begins by showing how the prejudicial framing of prospective interventions can be described 
in terms that amount to a playbook. In order then to demonstrate how a non-expert can deploy 
generic skills of critical reading, there follows some discussion of a case study.  
A significant general concern motivating the checking of factual reports cited as 
grounds for intervention is that ‘political leaders can promote a one-sided foreign policy as a 
response to foreign conflicts if the media continue to push a humanitarian (military) 
interventionist agenda, effectively leaving all other policy options off the table without any 
resistance from a public unaware of or less exposed to other proposed options.’ (Milojevich 
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and Beattie 2018: 849) This interventionist frame may be characterized by reference to the 
four main elements of a news frame as conceptualized by Robert M. Entman: 
‘(1) “Group A is being oppressed and suffering human rights abuses”; (2) “Dictator A and 
his hardline, ultra-nationalist government is using the military to violate human rights and 
suppress democracy in Country A”; (3) “Dictator A can only be stopped by the threat or 
use of military force”; and (4) “We cannot afford to do nothing while military aggression, 
democracy suppression, and human rights abuses continue” (Entman 2004: 24).’ 
The dynamic applied to those elements then involves a process of demonization, as David 
Willcox (2005) has described: 
‘First, the war or crisis is specifically personalized with the enemy leader so that the 
introduction of their name becomes synonymous with the conflict. Second, the individual, 
once directly associated with the conflict, is demonized, provoking negative connotations 
through the invoking of their name.’ (Willcox 2005: 92) 
 The question then is how one can know whether any claims so framed are not in fact 
true, for we should not assume that reports of atrocities are always prejudicially framed. So 
although the onus of proof lies with the would-be intervener, this is not a reason to dismiss a 
priori any purported proof offered. The reference to the framing is given as a guideline for 
critical questions that might be asked. What this section now focuses on is the nature of 
competences required in order to answer those questions.  
The claim to be developed is that these competences are of a kind commanded by 
anyone capable of intelligent critical report reading. For it is possible to evaluate critically the 
reports that are presented to support a case for action without oneself having direct or expert 
knowledge of the matters reported. While it is normally rational to defer to the authors of a 
report with respect to matters in which one has not done one’s own research, it is nonetheless 
appropriate to pay some critical attention to the soundness of a report when one in some way 
relies on it or has some stake in its potential consequences. A difference between this kind of 
due diligence and actual research is that it can focus on seeking out anomalies. It is not 
necessary that a reader be an expert in a matter to identify some kinds of anomalies in reports 
on it. Moreover, for a question like whether there is a case for humanitarian intervention, no 
single field of expert knowledge can offer a complete answer, and thus there is no single field 
in which to find a uniquely qualified expert. Non-experts may sometimes even have certain 
cognitive advantages over experts: they might discern unnoticed phenomena appearing 
between or across specialisms, or they may notice how findings from different fields might be 
synthesized in ways unnoticed by the several experts who generated them. Non-experts could 
thus notice anomalies that bear on the framing and assumptions of the authoritative 
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collaboration.8 In the critical reading of a report there are two general kinds of anomaly that 
might be identified by a non-expert: those internal to a report that show up as inconsistencies 
within it and external ones that can be brought to light through comparing the report with 
related reports or other available information sources. Specialist expertise does not 
necessarily stop a critical reader from identifying anomalies in a report, then. This is a matter 
of some potential significance when a report is presented as evidence in support of a possibly 
harmful course of action.  
However, when a given course of action is understood to have a presumptive 
justificatory basis in a ‘mountain of evidence’, so to speak, then the mere identification of an 
anomaly is in itself likely to be of limited actual significance. For in the development of 
expert knowledge, anomalies are encountered routinely, and a point about expertise is that it 
equips its possessor to deal appropriately with them. Anomalies can be dealt with by means of 
adjustments to peripheral elements of the research programme, by means of introducing or 
modifying auxiliary hypotheses, while leaving its core proposition untouched. The rationality 
of this approach is bound up with the reasonable presumption that, when a given scientist 
encounters an anomaly, this could be due to some failing on their part rather than a 
fundamental flaw in their model or research programme. Thus it would be a naïve 
understanding of scientific method and rationality to suppose that simply identifying an 
anomaly for a core proposition would falsify or suffice to refute it. 
Indeed, it is worth noting that critics who make a broad based challenge to the kind of 
core proposition advanced by advocates of a specific intervention are often accused of being 
conspiracy theorists, in a derogatory sense,9 because even if they do not engage in wild 
alternative conjectures, they can nonetheless be said to mistake an anomaly for a refutation. 
This criticism is conceptually useful in bringing focus to what is at stake in the present case 
because precisely the charge often levelled at objectors to intervention is that they are 
rejecting authoritative intelligence on the basis of nothing more than a speculative alternative. 
Since the blanket rejection of any and every ‘conspiracy theory’ would also not be rational – 
if only because we know that some of them have been vindicated – then such a theory can be 
                                                        
8 This is something that can routinely be observed in review panels, and something similar is assumed as the 
condition of possibility of trial juries delivering sound verdicts. 
9 Since this is often taken to be the only sense, it is worth being aware that ‘the conspiracy-theory label was 
popularized as a pejorative term by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a propaganda program initiated in 
1967’ (deHaven Smith 2013: 21). It is now generally accepted that ‘some of the labelling of particular views as 
“conspiracy theories” is a technique of governmentality’ (Knight, 2014: 348). In response, a number of 
philosophers have recently embarked on evaluating conspiracy theorizing as a rational form of intellectual inquiry 




rationally assessed in terms of its epistemic merits. Thus Steve Clarke (2002, 2007) has 
advocated the methodological proposal that, following Lakatos (1970), the way to decide 
whether to adhere to a conspiracy theory, or to abandon it, is by considering whether it is at 
the core of a progressive or a degenerating research programme. Certainly, this kind of 
general distinction is helpful to keep in mind when trying to decide, in any given context, 
between an ‘official narrative’ and a ‘conspiracy theory’, since it cuts through the prejudicial 
loadings of those descriptors to the issues that can potentially settle the contest: 
‘In a progressive research programme the proponents of a theory are able to anticipate new 
evidence and make predictions (and retrodictions) that are generally successful. By 
contrast, a degenerating research programme is characterised by a lack of successful 
predictions (and retrodictions) and by the subsequent modification of initial conditions and 
auxiliary hypotheses after new evidence has come in.’ (Clarke 2007: 167) 
At a certain point, it becomes irrational to continue with a degenerating research programme, 
although Lakatos did not attempt to say exactly when this would be, and Clarke considers it 
‘doubtful whether we could stipulate an exact point at which it becomes rational to abandon 
any particular theory.’ (Clarke 2007: 167) For, as philosophers of science more generally 
recognize, the mere fact of anomalous data ‘can never logically compel a scientist to abandon 
a particular hypothesis because the hypothesis is embedded in a network of beliefs, any one of 
which might be wrong’ (Chinn and Brewer 1993: 10). It is only with the development of a 
comprehensively better theory that one can speak of the old one being refuted. So it is 
possible meanwhile to adhere to a degenerating research programme even as the rationality of 
doing so diminishes.  
This means elements of judgment are integral to the process of scientific discovery, 
and the response of investigators to anomalies can itself stand to be judged in terms of its all-
things-considered rationality. Clark A. Chinn and William F. Brewer (1993) offer a 
conceptual framework that will be referred to in discussing the case study that follows. This 
distinguishes seven kinds of possible response to an anomaly: ignore it; reject it; exclude it 
from the domain of the accepted theory; hold it in abeyance; reinterpret the data to fit the 
accepted theory; reinterpret the data and make peripheral changes to the theory; accept the 
data and change the theory. Each kind of response will be more rational in certain situations 
than in others. Determining the rationality of a particular response in a given situation is in 
large measure a matter of judgment. It should be defensible in terms that non-experts ought to 
be able to understand so that in situations where evidence to justify intervention is at stake, 
and such a justification has to be publicly defensible, its basis needs to be publicly 
comprehensible.  
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The case study relates to international disagreement about how the United Nations’ 
commitment to a ‘responsibility to protect’ should be implemented with regard to the people 
in Syria. The doctrine stipulates three pillars of responsibility: every state should protect its 
people from mass atrocity crimes; the international community should encourage and assist 
individual states in meeting that responsibility; if a state is manifestly failing, the international 
community should intervene, with force if necessary (Bellamy 2015). The fact that since 2011 
mass atrocities have been occurring in Syria signals a need for action under the second pillar, 
but the controversy is whether the third has been triggered. For if the Syrian state is shown to 
have manifestly failed, despite having received encouragement and assistance from outside, 
then the international community would have to act against the holders of power in that state. 
To be clear, the purpose here is not to purport to settle controversy about such an 
immensely difficult and complex question. There are strong arguments and strong feelings on 
different sides of the terrible conflict. The question is whether, under such circumstances, the 
burden of proof that should satisfy nations of a responsibility to intervene decisively in favour 
of ousting a state’s leadership had, as far as could be determined on the basis of information 
made public in Western nations, been met. The case study, accordingly, focuses on claims 
made in public discussions that, for the sake of the humanitarian interests of the people of 
Syria, the country’s leadership should be ousted. The central proposition as publicly 
disseminated was that president Bashar al Assad ought to be removed from office. As 
justification, it assumes the intransigence and recalcitrance of the governing power has 
precluded meaningful action to achieve humanitarian objectives under the rubric of the 
second pillar, such as encouraging accelerated political reforms while supporting the state in 
protecting citizens against violent extremists. Insofar as the proposition also includes the 
possibility of imposing economic sanctions on Syria as a means to its end, it also implies a 
belief that the harms these inflict on the Syrian people are outweighed by the value of that 
end.10 So the Assad government has been determined to be the overriding problem and not a 
possible part of a feasible solution. The study will draw attention to certain anomalies for the 
core proposition – namely, that for the good of the Syrian people, “Assad must go” – and it 
shall assess the rationality of responses to those anomalies by reference to the framework of 
Chinn and Brewer (1993).   
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that this core proposition has been regarded as 
axiomatic by a great many who comment publicly in the West, including in academia. There, 
consensus was reached early in the conflict, the message being reinforced from many 
                                                        
10 The tension between economic sanctions and ostensibly humanitarian concern has been less reflected on than 
one might expect by Western commentators, although see Held (2008) and Averre and Davies (2015), as well as 
the response of Hayward (2018b) to Monbiot (2011). 
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quarters, and with virtually no dissenting opinion reaching Western ears. How accurate and 
objective was the information supporting it, however, is another matter; and such of it as 
came to public attention was certainly incomplete. With hindsight and the benefit of access to 
initially neglected sources, one can find in reports from the time a number of pieces of 
evidence that would have presented anomalies for the theory. However, since few of these 
were publicized in the Western media, and allowing reasonable assumptions about the 
likelihood of conflicting reports in such situations, it might be argued that, particularly under 
conditions of humanitarian emergency, it was rational to ignore the anomaly presented by 
those few that did appear.11 In conflict situations it is especially easy for reports simply to be 
mistaken. When anomalous reports came from organs of the Syrian state, however, one could 
not simply assume them to be mistaken, but they could plausibly be regarded as lacking 
impartiality or independent corroboration. So it was generally regarded as rationally 
defensible to reject them on the grounds of vested interest and partiality. 
An example of evidence that could not simply be ignored or straightforwardly 
rejected, however, was the result of the 2014 presidential election. The outcome – with Assad 
attaining 10,319,723 votes (88.7% of the vote) with a turnout put at 73.42%12 – would appear 
to present an anomaly for the proposition that “for the sake of the Syrian people Assad must 
go”. For even if a significant number took that view, they were not in the majority. 
Commentators who adhered to the proposition typically responded, however, by excluding 
the anomalous evidence from the domain of their theory. The result could not truly be 
accounted evidence against the proposition, they maintained, because the conditions of a 
genuinely free, fair and democratic election were absent: so although it superficially appears 
to rebut the proposition, a suitably sophisticated understanding of the situation would show 
that it is not genuinely admissible evidence.13 
As the war went on, with the Syrian Arab Army – a religiously pluralistic force – 
remaining resolutely loyal to the government (Alam 2014, 2016; Watt 2015), anomalies 
became harder to avoid. For instance, it came to be widely understood that arms and other 
supplies provided by foreign countries for ‘moderate rebels’ were falling into the hands of 
violent anti-democratic forces. Knowledge of this implied worrying questions about what 
                                                        
11 The number is small only relative to the orthodox view. Contemporary writings critical of the authorised account 
were in fact rather numerous. For syntheses of some of these see, for example: Abrahms (2017), Anderson (2016), 
Cockburn (2017), Dejevsky (2018), Gowans (2017), Hammond et al (2019), Hayward (2017; 2019b), Lynch et al 
(2014), Sen et al (2016), Kinzer (2016), Zollmann (2017). 
12 Reported in The Guardian 4 June 2014: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/04/bashar-al-assad-
winds-reelection-in-landslide-victory. 
13 This is to note a claim often heard asserted. The basis for it remains uncertain, as far as I have so far been able to 
discover, although see Fares (2014) for some relevant considerations. 
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would happen were Assad to go – questions that will have influenced the 2014 election result 
(Al Yafai 2014). However, this knowledge was largely set in abeyance by commentators in 
the West who continued to maintain their principled support for the ‘moderate opposition’, 
even as it became increasingly doubtful whether any of the groups fighting on the ground 
could reasonably be described as ‘moderate’, either in the socio-political ends they aimed at 
or in the coercive means they used to achieve them. 
But if the proposition could be defended in the face of particular anomalies, the fact 
that it had failed to receive practical confirmation of its implicit prediction, in the form of 
overwhelming endorsement of it by the people of Syria themselves, was something of a 
challenge for its defenders. Since no general upswell of a popular movement had put the case 
beyond practical dispute,14 the focus of the West's commentators – in government, the media, 
think tanks, and even academia – fastened instead on specific reasons why, nonetheless, 
Assad must go. Arguments of this kind may, in effect, reinterpret the data to fit the accepted 
theory. A datum that had to be accepted but could be reinterpreted was that the Syrian army 
and the people remaining in government-held areas appeared committed to supporting the 
Assad government against the insurgent forces. Thus while a straightforward argument from 
unpopularity could not be relied on, his apparent popularity could be interpreted as a 
symptom of other factors such as cronyism and patronage in some quarters, the incarceration 
or exile of critics, and widespread fear of dissent among the rest. Thus attention came to be 
focused on claims serving to explain why Assad would be widely feared and, accordingly, 
justifiably ousted. Three in particular have featured as recurring allegations directed against 
the person and ‘regime’ of Assad: the deliberate bombing of children and hospitals; 
widespread and systematic torture and mass murder in prisons; and the use of chemical 
weapons against both enemies and civilians. To be clear, there is no dispute that bombing has 
caused massive destruction and loss of life, but allegations of the systematic targeting of non-
combatants have consistently been disputed; nor is there dispute that the Syrian security 
apparatus and its detention centres were known for brutality even before the war, but 
evidence collected by prospective prosecutors so far shows that when senior commands have 
referred to torture they have in principle condemned it (Larson 2018a, 2018b). Regarding 
both allegations, the kinds of evidence human rights organisations have presented would not 
stand up in a court of law15 and do not establish the scale as extrapolated numbers from a 
                                                        
14 Even at the time of the original protests, and from a strongly anti-Assad perspective, it was noted that ‘few want 
revolution and many fear disorder and chaos. … Everyone wants change, but they want orderly change.’ Yassin-
Kassab (2011) The reality, according to Raymond Hinnebusch, was that any alternative government in Damascus 
would ‘be confronted with the same policy dilemmas and limited options that faced Asad’s, and will struggle to 
find better or even different answers to Syria’s intractable problems.’ (Hinnebusch 2012: 113) 
15 An example would be the collection of photographs, attributed to a defecting Syrian police photographer 
codenamed Caesar, that depict thousands of badly treated corpses. Certain human rights organisations have 
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certain number of confirmed cases. As for the chemical weapons allegations, these are highly 
controversial, and they will be commented upon in Section 3.  
So while it is right to regard as criminals under international law those who – on 
whichever side – are responsible for causing the horrendous suffering the people of Syria 
have endured since 2011, what is less clear is the evidence that could be appealed to in 
identifying the criminals. Yet notwithstanding the uncertainty of the evidence as verified as a 
basis for them, each of these classes of allegations leveled against one side has come to be 
accepted as well established by the preponderance of commentators in the West. To call any 
of them into question is to become liable to moral opprobrium and accusations of apologism 
for a brutal dictator and war criminal. It has thus been quite unusual to encounter more 
epistemically cautious views in the Western media. 
Knowing this, one would expect academic commentators to strive for the requisite 
detachment and methodological scrupulousness about the facts they are ready to accept as 
established. In fact, however, uncritical acceptance of the narrative that prevails in Western 
media has also permeated some of the academic discussion. Thus we find some scholars 
holding Assad or the ‘Assad regime’ to be uniquely or primarily in the wrong, rather than the 
situation being one of inevitable horrors of war on both sides, but without doing due diligence 
on the evidence their assurance rests on. For instance, Adrian Gallagher (2014) has 
categorically declared that ‘not only is the Syrian regime overwhelming responsibility (sic) 
for the violence carried out but at present it is the only actor to have committed war crimes 
and crimes against humanity’ (Gallagher 2014: 7). Yet, as evidence, he cites a UK 
government gloss (FCO 2013) of a UN report (UN 2013) that in fact records that crimes were 
being committed on all sides and that it was impossible accurately to determine responsibility 
for most of them. Even recently, and despite the increased opportunities meanwhile arising to 
learn reasons for skepticism, we find Constance Duncombe and Tim Dunne criticizing 
resistance to proposals of intervention on the grounds that ‘evidence of mass atrocities being 
committed in Syria is virtually uncontested’ (Duncombe and Dunne 2018: 36). The authors 
do not cite the sources of that evidence, however, so simply asserting that it is ‘virtually 
uncontested’, in a context where China, Russia and member states of the Non-Aligned 
                                                        
presented the Caesar photographs as evidence to demonstrate the scale and nature of alleged brutality in Syrian 
prisons, but their claims have been contextualized by the head of an organization gathering evidence of war 
crimes, Bill Wiley of the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA). The collection of 
images ‘has tremendous emotional and human value’, he says, yet ‘would it make a case against Assad? No, not at 
all, not at all.’ (Wiley interviewed in Al Jazeera 2017) He is clear that for advocacy groups like Amnesty and 
HRW ‘the burden of proof for the sort of evidence they need for their reports, it is very, very low. … Oftentimes 
they do allege crimes, in my opinion, incorrectly, but they are just drawing attention to the suffering.’ (Wiley 
2016) Observers who are not part of any prosecution team have much stronger criticisms to make, as noted in 
Hayward (2019c). 
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Movement contest it, leaves uncertain the standard of proof that might settle the contest. Thus 
we find Western academics following the politicians, journalists and other opinion formers in 
dismissing non-Western views as deriving from strategies of political expediency rather than 
from genuine concerns about reason and evidence. Contrary presumptions are meanwhile 
allowed to apply in the assessment of communications from the West.  
Yet it is open to question whether the generally accepted position has the robust 
verification assumed by those adopting it. Reliable information about events in Syria has not 
been easy to come by. Journalists have had little access, and the problem of Syrian state 
influence on reports from government held areas is matched by the problem that reports from 
opposition held areas are under the influence of opposition activists. Reports with claims to 
impartiality have been provided by influential NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
and Amnesty International (AI) – to name two that are widely respected in the West. Yet 
although their reporting has to a great extent been taken on trust (Boyd-Barrett 2019), and 
even cited in academic works debating the case for intervention in Syria, just a modest effort 
of due diligence reveals concerns about the bona fides of their sources and the reliability of 
their reports. My own interest in the present study was sparked by the simple observation that 
MSF was presenting as independent reports information based on secondhand testimony 
(Hayward 2016) – a problem that was subsequently acknowledged (MSF 2017).16 
Controversy has also surrounded Amnesty International’s reporting in Syria and other 
politically-charged conflicts (Boyle 2012; Human Rights Investigations 2012). These and 
other organisations have at times given expression to a moral sense that ‘something ought to 
be done’ to try and end the terrible suffering but without having a demonstrably adequate 
evidence base for the particular recommendations they have supported, even when these 
implicitly or explicitly appeal for Western intervention. Indeed, a tendency to try and shame 
Western governments into intervening has been given some encouragement by influential 
sections of the media, as Hammond et al (2019) document. Not only was the lack of an 
international decision to intervene militarily deemed a moral failure,17 but anyone who 
suggested that the moral question might be regarded differently – for instance, in terms of 
more assiduously engaging in responsible action as required by the first pillar of the R2P 
doctrine – were liable to be held up for public condemnation.18 
                                                        
16 However, there are evidently internal tensions at MSF about the issue.  MSF invited me to their annual research 
meeting in Brussels that year to discuss the dilemmas associated with ‘secondhand testimony’. That experience 
further enhanced my respect for MSF’s volunteer medics while reinforcing my sense that the MSF press office is 
part of a rather distinct operation.   
17 Duncombe and Dunne (2018: 36) speak of ‘the dire consequences of non-intervention in the case of Syria’. 
18 Hammond et al (2019) identify as a common theme the denouncing as ‘denialists’ those who questioned official 
claims about the war, with accusations that those who ‘willingly consumed such propaganda’ were guilty by 
association with the ‘Assadist-Putinist war machine’. The concern of those aiming to protect the core proposition, 
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This response to anomalies in the theories supporting the core proposition is of a kind 
not normally encountered in the development of a scientific research programme. The attempt 
to defend problematic auxiliary hypotheses by fiat amounts to any activity less like research 
than propaganda. The response shows that attempts to discharge the second epistemic duty – 
to protect against acceptance of unsound information – may sometimes not simply fail but 
even be actively obstructed. At this point, even diligent attempts to correct misinformation or 
to develop a rationally defensible response to anomalies have failed. In this situation the case 
for a third duty of epistemic diligence becomes evident. 
Section 3 
 
The third kind of duty comes into play when not only has anomalous information been 
insufficiently heeded but due consideration of it has been actively resisted. This situation, in 
which attempts to correct the record encounter ‘pushback’, is of a kind that lies outside the 
bounds of normal academic activity. For it does not correspond to practices of research that 
depend on constant error checking and correction; it is closer to activities of a kind associated 
with the production of propaganda. Nonetheless, even if a critic feels justified in identifying 
propaganda, this need not mean the promoted information is false. It is possible to grant that a 
piece of anomalous information has the potential to undermine an accepted view of current 
affairs while nonetheless judging deference to the accepted view to be rational on the grounds 
that the weight of evidence presented in the anomaly is not great enough to outweigh it. 
 A question arising in this situation, then, is whether not only are there anomalies in 
the given narrative account but whether it is also possible to formulate positive hypotheses 
that are more plausible – having an overall greater weight of evidence in their favour – than 
those problematised. Producing such an account is likely to be far more onerous than 
fulfilling either of the first two duties, and so one may wonder how this can be regarded as 
someone’s duty and whose it would be. These, then, are the guiding questions for this section: 
the first thing to establish, since ought implies can, is how the discharge of such a duty would 
even be practically possible; once that can be shown, the question is who it falls to and why. 
It is clearly not within the professional competence of a social philosopher to engage directly 
in the potentially complex empirically informed research required to construct alternative 
accounts. This kind of activity involves interdisciplinary collaboration. In order to make vivid 
                                                        
according to Hammond et al, was that they were increasingly coming up against sources of information and public 
opinion formation that were ‘questioning the simplistic moral narrative about Syria’ (Hammond et al 2019: 39) 
See also Allday (2016), Hayward (2018c), Mason (2018), Ritter (2017). 
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what this could realistically involve, and to show how there is nevertheless a potential role in 
it for the social philosopher, I shall return to the case study.  
In terms of the stages of response to anomalies as set out by Chinn and Brewer, we 
reached the point of considering whether there is a case for thinking the theory should be 
modified in more than a peripheral way. A context in which this arises is when a decisive 
reason to affirm “Assad must go” is that he is responsible for using chemical weapons, which 
would be to have crossed the ‘Red Line’ signaled by President Obama (Hersh 2014). Given 
that this allegation has been accorded critical weight in the case, and given that it is also a 
particularly difficult kind of allegation for a non-expert to assess, it presents a meaningful test 
of the approach that is now to be commended as an illustration of how the third duty could be 
discharged. 
Early critical assessments of published reports of alleged chemical weapon attacks 
appeared as certain individual citizens and independent journalists noted anomalies in them; 
and this led to some clustering of informal research collectives that pooled observations and 
hypotheses, collaborating online using blogs and wikis. Participants came from a variety of 
professional and educational backgrounds in several countries.19 Following these discussions 
was Edinburgh University epidemiologist Professor Paul McKeigue. Finding that the 
informal collectives were developing hypotheses that seemed more credible than the officially 
approved ones, he set out a methodological basis upon which to compare the likelihoods of 
competing hypotheses (McKeigue 2017a). He thereupon demonstrated how alternative 
explanations for certain chemical weapons events were more likely than the official ones 
(McKeigue 2017b).  
McKeigue was to become, along with Piers Robinson and myself, a founding 
member of an informal research collective called the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda 
and Media (WGSPM). This group has gone on to publish a number of Briefing Notes on 
specific alleged cases. 
Even before WGSPM had published any briefing, however, a succession of articles 
by former Guardian journalist Brian Whitaker would warn the public of 'propaganda 
professors' who were 'promoting conspiracy theories'.20 There followed shortly afterwards an 
attack on the group’s founder members by The Times of London, its front page headline 
denouncing ‘Apologists for Assad in our Universities’. This attack – like others that have 
                                                        
19 Citations of examples are to be found in the various works lead-authored by McKeigue. Although the question 
cannot be explored here, it could be interesting to consider whether these critical and collaborative online 
investigators have the makings of a movement of 'organic intellectuals' in a Gramscian sense. 
20 For links to these and other attacks see https://timhayward.wordpress.com/syria/working-group-in-the-
press/wgspm-timeline-of-hostile-media-coverage/ 
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continued to be directed against the group21 – did not identify any error in its published 
briefings. Thus the response to the highlighted anomalies took a form that would be predicted, 
not by a model of the development of scientific knowledge, but by the model proposed by 
Herman and Chomsky (1988) of how corporate news media constrain and direct 
communications. According to their propaganda model of information filters, when subtle 
discouragement about off-limits topics fails, then a more overt form will be deployed. This is 
called 'flak', a term that refers to efforts to discredit those who challenge the limits of debate 
set by the other filters. Since flak operates ad hominem, one would not expect it to work in an 
environment where such logically fallacious forms of argument are diligently avoided – e.g. 
within academia – but it can fulfill strategic communicative purposes when used by news 
media. These can also reverberate into academia (Robinson 2018). 
Nevertheless, while ad hominem slurs manifest a fallacious mode of argument, their 
deployment does not in and of itself show that no genuine counter argument might be 
advanced by more intellectually adroit defenders of the official narrative. So there remains to 
consider the substance of the matter, as, for instance, concerning the alleged chemical attack 
in Douma, on 7 April 2018. This allegation served as justification for the forces of US, UK 
and France to fire 103 missiles into Syria in retaliation. The evidence appealed to was 
problematic on its face, and yet when even senior military figures Lord West and General 
Shaw voiced skepticism on television news channels they were cut short by their 
interviewers.22 The one prominent media figure to depart from orthodoxy and argue against a 
rush to judgment was Tucker Carlson on the Fox News Channel.23  
Meanwhile, the international public awaited the report from the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to settle the matter. The wait, however, became 
inexplicably protracted, and the final report that had been expected by summer 2018 was only 
eventually published in March 2019. WGSPM identified significant failings in it (McKeigue, 
Miller and Robinson 2019a). For instance, it left unclear why the OPCW’s Fact-Finding 
Mission (FFM) had not released toxicology reports or why it had apparently made no 
engineering assessments during its April visit to the site but instead waited six months to 
commission some from unidentified third parties who had to rely on images and 
measurements obtained by others.  
                                                        
21 See https://timhayward.wordpress.com/syria/working-group-in-the-press/wgspm-timeline-of-hostile-media-
coverage/ 
22 A list of links to media coverage of relevant questions is included in Hayward (2018a). 
23 Tucker covered the issue in three Fox News reports: 9 April 2018: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cSGf2ZpDENU&feature=youtu.be; 11 April 2018: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fPQ9uA_M1Eg; 18 April 2018: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7R2QhK0-Pe8 
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The latter question would be answered in startling fashion when, in May 2019, the 
WGSPM received a leaked document revealing that an engineering assessment – signed by 
OPCW FFM sub-team leader Ian Henderson – had indeed been carried out onsite during the 
original OPCW inspection. The findings of this suppressed assessment substantially 
contradicted the conclusion delivered in the official published report by implicitly exculpating 
the Syrian government (McKeigue, Miller and Robinson 2019b). The revelation happened to 
be timely, given the specific threat of US war against Iran at that time. Tucker Carlson picked 
up on Henderson’s document as vindication of his earlier caution,24 and being now a close 
adviser of the president, he was to be credited with having stayed the president’s hand in 
response to calls from more hawkish advisers for forceful action against Iran (Wright 2019).  
This example suffices to indicate that the WGSPM research programme is a 
progressive one – for the revelation of the engineers’ assessment verifies an implicit novel 
prediction. Another novel prediction that still stands to be verified is the existence of 
toxicology reports that would present further anomalies in relation to the official story.25 
Meanwhile, several points may be taken away from this brief case study regarding the 
third duty of epistemic diligence. One is that the ought-implies-can condition is satisfied. For 
the WGSPM has shown that official narratives can be credibly questioned and alternatives 
suggested that satisfy the methodological requirements of academic work. The question then 
is whether there is a duty on anyone to do it. While the WGSPM example provides one model 
of how it can be done, the group’s members responded to a sense of responsibility directly, in 
what might be regarded as an ad hoc way. Such a response might be regarded as 
supererogatory. No individual WGSPM member has been under any special duty in the 
matter. Nor has anybody else. The idea of identifiable individuated duties following directly 
from the humanitarian imperative does not seem appropriate or feasible to argue for. Instead, 
the matter might be approached from the perspective provided by the premise of a collective 
humanitarian responsibility. Relevant to the case at hand is that the OPCW was mandated by 
the United Nations on behalf of humanity to ensure chemical weapons are not used. If certain 
actors undermine the proper workings of the OPCW (McKeigue et al 2019d), then the rest of 
humanity has a collective responsibility to protect, and where necessary restore, the OPCW’s 
                                                        
24  “If he’s right, the United States went to the brink of war on the basis of fraudulent information.” (Tucker 
Carlson, Fox News 23 May 2019) Discussing the revelation with Tulsi Gabbard on his Fox News show, their 
conversation linked the questionable pretext for bombing Syria with concerns about the then-current dangerous 
confrontation with Iran: https://video.foxnews.com/v/6040492421001/. 
25 Since this article was accepted for publication, that further prediction has been verified. A panel of international 
experts convened by the Courage Foundation – and endorsed by OPCW founding General Director José Bustani – 
had an opportunity to see and hear first hand whistleblower evidence that included revelations of suppressed 
toxicology findings contradicting the official report: https://couragefound.org/2019/10/analytical-points-opcw-
panel/. 
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work and reputation. Appropriate steps would include supporting honest investigators at the 
OPCW who strive to present the world with information that has been produced by following 
the organisation’s prescribed protocols. For this is likely to reduce the chance of avoidable 
warfare.  
More generally, if international institutions can fail, and if an aspect of the failure is 
such as involves knowledge claims that could be corrected by means of appropriate 
investigation, then humanity ought to be able to look to universities as institutions well suited 
to doing the necessary epistemic diligence. The foreseeable objection that universities are 
fundamentally unsuited to the kind of work more traditionally undertaken by journalists and 
intelligence agencies rests on a rigid distinction between different kinds of intellectual labour 
that is breaking down in contemporary digital information environments. Universities are in 
fact already getting drawn into this kind of activity, and so there is arguably a duty on their 
part to do it according to proper academic standards (Hayward 2019a). 
At present, universities are not fulfilling the responsibility as argued for here, but the 
need for them to do so has a further aspect to mention. The work of critically engaging with 
the strategic communications of powerful actors can encounter active resistance. Engaging in 
it thus requires – as has long been recognized by thinkers alert to the social responsibility of 
intellectuals – a certain firmness of resolve. Bertrand Russell has spoken of the risks run by 
those who take a stand against ‘the powerful organizations which control most of human 
activity’ (Russell 1960). Russell’s answer is that the risks will diminish, the more people are 
willing to accept them.26 Thus a point to highlight is that what is both a pre-requisite and a 
benefit of collaboration and commitment in the face of hostility is the solidarity of people 
standing together in fulfillment of ‘their moral responsibility as decent human beings in a 
position to use their privilege and status to advance the cause of freedom, justice, mercy, and 
peace’ (Chomsky 2011). For this is not simply a matter of beliefs about fundamental ethical 
values but one that concerns the very epistemological conditions of intellectual inquiry as 
such. Accordingly, it is arguable that taking such a stand is an inescapable part of the 
intellectual integrity that binds the community of scholars and gives worth to their vocation. 
Thus, anticipating the argument that universities ought to be neutral with respect to normative 
controversies and promote 'pure' science, it can be pointed out that as long as they are allowed 
                                                        
26 He reasons: ‘for everybody knows that the modern world depends upon scientists, and, if they are insistent, they 
must be listened to. We have it in our power to make a good world; and, therefore, with whatever labor and risk, 
we must make it’ (Russell 1960). In similar vein, Noam Chomsky considers it a responsibility of intellectuals ‘to 
speak out not simply about the abuses of our enemies, but, far more significantly, about the crimes in which we are 
implicated and can ameliorate or terminate if we choose’. In support of this view, he believes, there is not much 
that needs to be said ‘beyond some simple truths. Intellectuals are typically privileged—merely an observation 
about usage of the term. Privilege yields opportunity, and opportunity confers responsibilities. An individual then 
has choices.’ 
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to be complicit in maintaining propagandized falsehoods, even passively, let alone actively, 
they are precisely failing to maintain relevantly meaningful neutrality. Universities 
accordingly ought to be actively hospitable to supporting what is, effectively, a necessary 
condition of their existence as the kind of institution they publicly aspire to be. This means 
not simply providing space for such research and protecting the academic freedom of those 
engaging in it, but also actively encouraging and incentivising the substantive investigations, 
teaching and outreach required to ensure the intellectual community is fully exercising the 
responsibility it has to ensure humanity is well informed about the most serious issues it 
faces. 
The kind of investigation illustrated here is clearly not something that every academic 
will have an interest in or aptitude for, and it would be unrealistic and unreasonable to argue 
anyone has duties to do exactly as WGSPM members, for instance, have done – particularly 
as the merits of their research model and outputs have anyway still to be fully evaluated by 
peers. Moreover, to play a part in combatting errors with potentially grave consequences can 
involve effort and a need for some resilience. Yet the argument here is that anyone genuinely 
interested in applying ethics to matters of the kind illustrated should be prepared to accept this 
practical responsibility.  
Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that we can and should do epistemic due diligence regarding the 
assumptions we allow about the world when engaging in applied philosophy. This includes 
taking appropriately proactive measures to ensure that the sources we rely on are not 
deceptive due to the influence of heteronomous determinations originating from outside the 
sphere of disinterested inquiry. 
Given particularly a collective responsibility of humanity to guard against crimes 
against humanity, the presumption of which is the normative premise granted in this argument 
to those who may argue for coercive intervention to that end, there is an important part to be 
played by universities and intellectuals in general. For they are the social institutions and 
classes of individuals functionally entrusted by the wider society to enhance, protect and 
disseminate dependable knowledge and understanding about the world. The argument of this 
paper is not that social philosophers have a duty in this respect that is not shared by the 
academic collectivity. A distinct responsibility we do have is to ensure that the community is 
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